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Dynamic Incentives for Optimal Control of Competitive Power Systems
Abstract
This work presents a real-time dynamic pricing framework for future electricity markets. Deduced by first-principles analysis of physical, economic, and communication constraints within the power system, the proposed feedback control mechanism ensures both closed-loop system stability and economic efficiency at any given time. The resulting price signals are able to incentivize competitive market participants to eliminate spatio-temporal shortages in power supply quickly and purposively- doc-type:doctoralThesis
- Text
- info:eu-repo/semantics/doctoralThesis
- dissertation
- info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
- Strommarkt
- Dynamische Optimierung
- Spieltheorie
- Nichtlinearer Reglerentwurf
- Mathematische Modellbildung
- Electricity Market
- Dynamic Optimization
- Game Theory
- Nonlinear Control
- Mathematical Modeling
- ddc:620
- Engineering & allied operations
- info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/620
Similar works
This paper was published in KITopen.
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