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oaioai:RePEc:fem:femwpa:2005.132

Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games

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This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.Policy games, policy ineffectiveness, static controllability, Nash equilibrium existence

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This paper was published in Research Papers in Economics.

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