Composable Security in the Bounded-Quantum-Storage Model

Abstract

We give a new, simulation-based, definition for security in the bounded-quantum-storage model, and show that this definition allows for sequential composition of protocols. Damg\xc3\xa5rd et al. (FOCS \xe2\x80\x9905, CRYPTO \xe2\x80\x9907) showed how to securely implement bit commitment and oblivious transfer in the bounded-quantum-storage model, where the adversary is only allowed to store a limited number of qubits. However, their security definitions did only apply to the standalone setting, and it was not clear if their protocols could be composed. Indeed, we show that these protocols are not composable in our framework without a small refinement. We then prove the security of their randomized oblivious transfer protocol with our refinement. Secure implementations of oblivious transfer and bit commitment follow easily by a (classical) reduction to randomized oblivious transfer