The Standardization of Judicial Decisions by Artificial Intelligence: A Critique for the New Science of Law

Abstract

The standardization of decisions by the informatics of law, aiming at an exact science would result in a science in which progress and transformations would not drive the emergence of new rights or the readjustment of those already established. The present article proposed to examine, by means of a doctrinal-critical analysis, the impacts of the advance of the new automated technique of law, especially considering the configurations of a legal Fordism. We sought to answer what is the possibility of implementing Artificial Intelligence in the civil jurisdictional process and what would be the possible consequences, with regard to the advancement of rights already established and the advent of new rights through jurisdictional provision. The hypothetical-deductive approach was chosen, with the purpose of analyzing the problematic regarding the failures of the Fordist legal science. The monographic and historical methods of procedure were used, together with the bibliographical research technique, for a better analysis of the theme and the basis of the critical-conclusive analysis. Finally, what can be deduced is the need for constant improvement and in-depth studies before the artificial machine, which is not even capable of understanding the basic principles of law as a guarantee of the citizen’s humanity