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LIPIcs - Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics. 44th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming (ICALP 2017)
Doi
Abstract
We consider a price competition between two sellers of perfect-complement goods. Each seller posts a price for the good it sells, but the demand is determined according to the sum of prices. This is a classic model by Cournot (1838), who showed that in this setting a monopoly that sells both goods is better for the society than two competing sellers.
We show that non-trivial pure Nash equilibria always exist in this game. We also quantify Cournot\u27s observation with respect to both the optimal welfare and the monopoly revenue. We then prove a series of mostly negative results regarding the convergence of best response dynamics to equilibria in such games
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