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ATTACKS ON THE AKACP PROTOCOL

Abstract

We discuss a recently proposed one-pass authenticated key agreement protocol, by Mohammad, Chen, Hsu and Lo, which was “derived” from their correponding two-pass version and claimed to be secure. We show that this is not the case by demonstrating a number of vulnerabilities

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Cryptology ePrint Archive

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Last time updated on 25/08/2023

This paper was published in Cryptology ePrint Archive.

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