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International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR)
Abstract
We present the first formal mathematical presentation of the generalized Russian cards problem, and provide rigorous security definitions that capture both basic and extended versions of weak and perfect security notions. In the generalized Russian cards problem, three players, Alice, Bob, and Cathy, are dealt a deck of n cards, each given a, b, and c cards, respectively. The goal is for Alice and Bob to learn each other\u27s hands via public communication, without Cathy learning the fate of any particular card. The basic idea is that Alice announces a set of possible hands she might hold, and Bob, using knowledge of his own hand, should be able to learn Alice\u27s cards from this announcement, but Cathy should not. Using a combinatorial approach, we are able to give a nice characterization of informative strategies (i.e., strategies allowing Bob to learn Alice\u27s hand), having optimal communication complexity, namely the set of possible hands Alice announces must be equivalent to a large set of tβ(n,a,1)-designs, where t=aβc. We also provide some interesting necessary conditions for certain types of deals to be simultaneously informative and secure. That is, for deals satisfying c=aβd for some dβ₯2, where bβ₯dβ1 and the strategy is assumed to satisfy a strong version of security (namely perfect (dβ1)-security), we show that a=d+1 and hence c=1. We also give a precise characterization of informative and perfectly (dβ1)-secure deals of the form (d+1,b,1) satisfying bβ₯dβ1 involving dβ(n,d+1,1)-designs
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