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International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR)
Abstract
Cayley hash functions are based on a simple idea of using a pair of
(semi)group elements, A and B, to hash the 0 and 1 bit, respectively, and then to hash an arbitrary bit string in the natural way, by using multiplication of elements in the (semi)group. In this paper, we focus on hashing with 2×2 matrices over Fp. Since there are many known pairs of 2×2 matrices over Z that generate a free monoid, this yields numerous pairs of matrices over Fp, for a sufficiently large prime p, that are candidates for collision-resistant hashing. However, this trick can ``backfire , and lifting matrix entries to Z may facilitate finding a collision. This ``lifting attack was successfully used by Tillich and Zémor in the special case where two matrices A and B generate (as a monoid) the whole monoid SL2(Z+). However, in this paper we show that the situation with other, ``similar , pairs of matrices from SL2(Z) is different, and the ``lifting attack can (in some cases) produce collisions in the {\it group} generated by A and B, but not in the positive {\it monoid}. Therefore, we argue that for these pairs of matrices, there are no known attacks at this time that would affect security of the corresponding hash functions. We also give explicit lower bounds on the length of collisions for hash functions corresponding to some particular pairs of matrices from SL2(Fp)
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