Towards Tightly Secure Short Signature and IBE

Abstract

Constructing short signatures with tight security from standard assumptions is a long-standing open problem. We present an adaptively secure, short (and stateless) signature scheme, featuring a constant security loss relative to a conservative hardness assumption, Short Integer Solution (SIS), and the security of a concretely instantiated pseudorandom function (PRF). This gives a class of tightly secure short lattice signature schemes whose security is based on SIS and the underlying assumption of the instantiated PRF. Our signature construction further extends to give a class of tightly and adaptively secure ``compact Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) schemes, reducible with constant security loss from Regev\u27s vanilla Learning With Errors (LWE) hardness assumption and the security of a concretely instantiated PRF. Our approach is a novel combination of a number of techniques, including Katz and Wang signature, Agrawal et al.\ lattice-based secure IBE, and Boneh et al.\ key-homomorphic encryption. Our results, at the first time, eliminate the dependency between the number of adversary\u27s queries and the security of short signature/IBE schemes in the context of lattice-based cryptography. They also indicate that tightly secure PRFs (with constant security loss) would imply tightly, adaptively secure short signature and IBE schemes (with constant security loss)