We are not able to resolve this OAI Identifier to the repository landing page. If you are the repository manager for this record, please head to the Dashboard and adjust the settings.
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of m indivisible goods to aset of n agents. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) criteria -- whichrequires that no agent prefers the bundle of another agent after removal of anysingle good -- is known to be a remarkable analogous of envy-freeness when theresource is a set of indivisible goods. In this paper, we investigate EFXnotion for the restricted additive valuations, that is, every good has somenon-negative value, and every agent is interested in only some of the goods. We introduce a natural relaxation of EFX called EFkX which requires that noagent envies another agent after removal of any k goods. Our maincontribution is an algorithm that finds a complete (i.e., no good is discarded)EF2X allocation for the restricted additive valuations. In our algorithm wedevise new concepts, namely "configuration" and "envy-elimination" that mightbe of independent interest. We also use our new tools to find an EFX allocation for restricted additivevaluations that discards at most βn/2ββ1 goods. This improvesthe state of the art for the restricted additive valuations by a factor of 2.<br
Is data on this page outdated, violates copyrights or anything else? Report the problem now and we will take corresponding actions after reviewing your request.